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Abstract
This paper develops a new way to estimate cost synergies from mergers without using
actual data on cost. The estimator uses a structural model in which companies play a dynamic
game with endogenous mergers and product repositioning decisions. Such a formulation has
several benets over the widespread static merger analysis. In particular, it corrects for
sample selection of more protable mergers and captures follow-up mergers and post-merger
product repositioning.
The framework is applied to estimate cost eciencies after the deregulation of U.S. radio in
1996. The procedure uses the data on radio station characteristics and numerous acquisitions,
without explicit need for cost data. It turns out that between 1996 and 2006 additional
ownership concentration generated $2.5b per-year cost savings, which is about 10% of total
industry revenue.
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11 Introduction
The extent to which a potential merger generates cost eciencies is often mentioned by managers
as a major motivation to merge. Moreover, potential xed cost savings generated by a merger are
recognized by the Horizontal Merger Guidelines as a factor that can provide consumers with direct
price-related as well as non-price-related benets. Thus, for antitrust purposes one should evaluate
cost savings in addition to measuring the decrease in competition. However, this approach is rarely
used in practice, because in most cases reliable cost data are unavailable. This paper provides a
solution to this problem, by proposing a method to estimate cost synergies without using any data
on cost. This method requires only panel data on the ownership structure, product characteristics,
and prices and quantities, information that in most cases is easily accessible.
Evaluating the underlying causes of ownership consolidation requires a dynamic model in which
mergers are endogenous. However, most past empirical work analyzed mergers in a static frame-
work and treats market structure as given. Papers by Nevo (2000), Pinkse and Slade (2004),
Ivaldi and Verboven (2005) exogenously impose changes in market structure on a static equilib-
rium model and calculate counterfactual changes in prices and welfare. These models are very
useful in addressing the short run impacts of mergers but do not account for changes in market
structure that might happen as a result of a merger. Benkard, Bodoh-Creed, and Lazarev (2008)
evaluate the longer run eects of a merger on market structure, but still treat it as an exogenous
one-time event. Neither of these approaches allows for estimating the supply side determinants
of mergers, such as cost synergies. Furthermore, the assumption that mergers are exogenous may
create a selection bias that results in overestimating the cost synergies (we might pick up other
unobserved components correlated with the propensity to merge). Furthermore, recent models
assume away follow-up mergers and post-merger repositioning of products.
To address these issues, I propose a dynamic model in the spirit of Gowrisankaran (1999) in
which mergers and product positioning are endogenous and are assumed to happen sequentially.
Such an approach enables me to estimate the cost eciencies of consolidation without any data on
cost. It also eliminates the shortcomings mentioned earlier, because it incorporates the dynamic
processes directly into the model. Moreover, endogenizing mergers allows for correction of sample
selection by using a procedure in the spirit of Heckman (1979), adjusted for a dynamic game
2environment.
The model is subsequently applied to analyze ownership consolidation in the U.S. radio indus-
try. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 increased local-market radio station ownership caps,
triggering an unprecedented merger wave that had the eect of eliminating many small and in-
dependent radio owners. From 1996 to 2006, the average Herndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) in
local radio markets grew from 0.18 to 0.26, the average number of owners in the market dropped
from 16.6 to 12.4, and the average number of stations owned grew from 1.6 to 2.3. Such dra-
matic changes to the market structure have raised concerns about anti-competitive aspects of the
deregulation (Leeper (1999), Drushel (1998), Klein (1997)). After estimating the model using the
method of Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2004), I nd that the main incentives to merge in radio
come from the cost side. Total cost side savings amount to $2.5b per year, constituting about
10% of total industry revenue. Such cost synergies are an order of magnitude higher than the
anti-competetive eects of these mergers identied by Jeziorski (2010). Moreover, the fact that
consolidation leads to substantial cost side synergies leads me to conclude that the Telecom Act
made radio advertising more competitive against other media, such as TV or the Internet.
To my knowledge, Gowrisankaran (1999) is the only applied paper that uses a dynamic frame-
work to endogenize mergers. His analysis argued that merger dynamics are very important. The
main drawback of his analysis is that it was never t to real data. This was due in part to the
complexity of his model and in part to the lack of a good dataset. To solve the complexity problem,
I utilize the latest developments in the dynamic-games literature. These developments enable us
to estimate very complicated models without explicitly solving them (Bajari, Benkard, and Levin
(2004)). This paper also contributes to empirical literature on demand and cost curve estima-
tion (this started with Rosse (1970) and Rosse (1967)), by accounting explicitly for the demand
side incentives to merge. On the technical side, my model shares some similarities with Sweeting
(2007). I concentrate on questions about incentives to merge and the impact of consolidation on
welfare, while Sweeting focuses mainly on estimates of the format switching cost. My analysis also
extends his model by adding a model of ad quantity choices and endogenous mergers. Another
paper on a similar topic is O'Gorman and Smith (2008). They use a static oligopoly model to
estimate the cost curve in radio. They nd that the xed cost savings when owning two stations is
bounded between between 20% and 50% of per-station costs (I estimate this number to be 20%).
3I supplement their estimates by accounting for selection bias, follow-up mergers and post-merger
repositioning as outlined above.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a exible, structural merger model that
can applied to many industries. The estimation procedure is discussed in Section 3. Section 4
describes the application of the framework to analyze the merger wave in the U.S. radio industry.
Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Merger and repositioning framework
This section presents the dynamic oligopoly model of an industry with dierentiated products in
the spirit of Ericson and Pakes (1995). The industry is modeled as a dynamic game and the players
are companies holding portfolios of dierent products (brands). The modeling eort emphasizes
the actions of companies changing the profolio of owned products, specically rebranding and
acquisitions. The model is general enough to encompass a number of dierent industries and types
of competition, by allowing for a large range of dierent single-period prot functions and cost
structures.
2.1 Industry basics
The industry is composed of M dierent markets that operate in discrete time over an innite
horizon. The payo relevant market characteristics at time t are fully characterized by a set of
covariates dmt 2 D that include demand shifters. In each market m, there are up to Km operating
rms and up to Jm active products. Let oj 2 Km be the owner of the product j. I assume that




j). In particular, ft
j 2 F is a discrete
characteristic, and t
j 2  is a continuous characteristic of the product. The state of the industry
at the beginning of each period is therefore a duple (st;dt) 2 S  D.
To simplify the further exposition dene Ot
k to be the number of products owned by the rm
k, and Ot
 k to be the number of products owned by its competitors.
42.2 Players' actions
Firms can undertake two types of actions: product acquisitions and product repositioning. I
assume that acquisitions take place rst and the results are common knowledge before the rms
commence with repositioning.
In general, the product acquisition process can be very complicated. Firms can acquire any
subset of products owned by competitors, and multiple rms can bid to acquire the same product.
Therefore, the most general model of this process is likely to be intractable both analytically and
numerically. Additionally, the model of mergers without additional structure is likely to generate
multiple equilibria, which will signicantly complicate its estimation. To solve these problems,
I follow Gowrisankaran (1999) and I assume that the station acquisition process is sequential.
Owners move in a sequence specied by a function A : st 7! i, where i is a permutation of the
active owners' index f1;:::;Kg. In addition, for notational purposes, I set i(K + 1) = K + 1.
Let !t
i(k) be the state of the industry observed by the k-th mover in the merger process, before
making acquisition decisions. !t
i(1) is set to be equal to st. Additionally, every player observes a








These prices are the outcomes of a bargaining process that is only a function of the current
observable state !t
i(k). This assumption holds if !t
i(k) is the only payo relevant variable for both
the acquirer and the acquiree and the prices are determined by a Nash Bargaining Solution.
In addition to prices, the potential buyer observes a set of additive payo/cost shocks from
acquiring any competitor owned product t
k = ft
kj : ot
j 6= kg that is his private information.
A player's i(k) action involves specifying which subset of stations are to be acquired. I restrict











After the decisions are made, a new ownership !t
i(k+1) is determined, and it becomes common
knowledge. Player a(k + 1) proceeds with acquisitions, or if there are no move active players, the
game moves to product repositioning.
5A product repositioning involves decisions about changing discrete characteristics ft
j of owned
products, in exchange for paying a switching cost C(fj;f
t+1
j ). It is, similarly to acquisitions, a
sequential process, and it is assumed that rms proceed according to the same sequence i(k)1.
The rst mover i(1) in the repositioning process conditions his decision on the state of the
industry after the acquisitions, i.e., the observable state ~ !t
i(1) is equal to !t
i(K+1). In the same way
the k-th mover i(k) observers the repositionings done by all the previous movers. This information
is summarized in ~ !t
i(k). In addition to observing the state ~ !t
i(k), the k-th mover observes payo/cost
shocks for all the products of any potential type  t
k = f t
kjf : ot
j = k;1  f  Fg. The product
repositioning policy is a Markov strategy given by the mapping








When the choices of player i(k) are made a new industry state ~ !t
i(k+1) becomes a common knowl-
edge.
After repositioning the new industry state (st+1;dt+1) is determined. st+1 is constructed by
combining ~ !t
i(K+1) with the values of a new continuous product characteristic t+1 The following
assumptions restrict the dynamics of .
Assumption 2.1. jt evolves as an exogenous Markov process, for example
jt = jt 1 + t (2.1)
where t is a mean zero IID random variable.
Moreover, market covariates are also assumed to be exogenous and Markov
Assumption 2.2. dt evolves as an exogenous Markov process.
These assumptions are made for simplicity of estimation. They could be potentially relaxed if
more data is available. For example, if  is a product quality, one could assume that it is also a
dynamic choice variable and estimate it directly from the observed investment.
When the new industry state is (st+1;dt+1) realized rms then play a static competition game
that yelds prots given by  k(st+1;dt).
1This assumption is made for the simplicity of exposition and might be easily relaxed.
62.3 Payos and equilibrium

















































k) is the xed cost of owning portfolio st
k, and  k is a one-shot prot from the portfolio.
Let g = (a1;:::;aK;b1;:::;bK) be a Markov strategy prole. It can be shown that this pro-
le and an initial condition (s;d) determine the unique, controlled Markov process over states,
acquisition prices P, payo shocks   and , and market covariates d
P(g;s;d) 2 (S  P  	    D  T )
where T is a time horizon, and  is a set of probability measures. P is therefore a discrete time
stochastic process on S P 	D. This process is also supplied with a ltration, such that
the strategy prole g is measurable.
Each owner is maximizing the expected discounted sum of prots taking the strategies of












It is assumed that the markets are in a Markov Perfect Equilibrium, i.e., rms choose strategy








For simplicity, I restrict my attention to symmetric equilibria. The next section describes the
estimation procedure.
3 Estimation
Consider parameterizations of the xed cost F(st




j jC). This section outlines a procedure, based on Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2004), to
obtain consistent estimators of F and C without using direct data on cost.
7The procedure has two stages. The st stage infers equilibrium behavior from the data on
one or a set of similar industries. The second stage estimates the cost parameters for a particular
industry by imposing the dynamic game equilibrium inequalities 2.4. The following subsection
describes the data needed for this procedure to work.
3.1 Data
Consider an industry, or a set of similar industries, operating in M markets over the discrete time
span T. Data is given by the set X = fxtm : 1  m  M;1  t  Tg. Each point in the data
xtm describes the state of the industry at the beginning of the period stm = (ftm;tm;otm), market
covariates/demand shifters dtm, and a set of transaction prices P mt. The data does not have to
contain any direct information on the cost. This is convenient since most of the data on cost suers
from accounting issues. Therefore direct cost estimates from the data might be unreliable.
To facilitate the inference process a standard assumption about the data generating process is
made: that it is generated by a single MPE strategy prole g. Crucially, the dataset needs to
contain a reasonable amount of within market acquisitions and repositioning to allows it to identify
equilibrium strategies. Sometimes it is possible to obtain such datasets within one industry (see
U.S. radio in the application), however for most industries such datasets are unavailable. In this
case, it is possible to pool similar industries to construct one dataset. To make this work one needs
a slightly stronger assumption that equilibrium behavior is the same across the pooled industries.
The transaction prices are helpful but not necessary to identify the cost parameters. Estimation
is possible without them but it requires more assumptions about the bargaining process during the
acquisition, as well as much more computing power. The extra steps needed to proceed without
the prices are mentioned in Appendix A.
In order to simplify the exposition all state variables are assumed to be observed. However,
the procedure also applies to problems in which some payo relevant information is unobserved
to the econometrician. In many cases one can infer the unobserved state variable from a static
estimation of the one-shot prot function  . One example of such a case is Berry, Levinsohn,
and Pakes (1995) estimator, which uses dierences of static market shares to identify unobserved
product quality. Moreover, there are numerous ways to proceed in case one cannot directly infer
all the latent state variables. For example, one could supply the procedure from this chapter with
8an EM algorithm proposed by Arcidiacono and Miller (2010).
3.2 Policy estimation




k (akj!k;dk), and Prob
R
k (bkj~ !k;dk), be the probabilities of taking acquisition and reposi-
tioning actions. The former is a probability measure on f0;1gO k, and the latter on f1;:::;FgOk.
They are constructed by integrating out unobservable payo shocks  and  . The goal of this
subsection is to provide a procedure that allows us to obtain the estimates of these probability
measures. This procedure leverages on the sequentiality assumptions made in the previous section.
The rst step of the procedure is constructing an auxiliary dataset using a sequential structure
of the acquisition and repositioning process. For each t, the predened sequence of player moves
i = I(st) species a mapping
(st;st+1) 7! (!i(1);:::;!i(K); ~ !i(1);::: ~ !i(K))






k ) : 1  k  K;1  m  M;1  t  Tg
where atm
k is a vector of zeros and ones that indicates acquisition decisions for player k. The second






k ) : 1  k  K;1  m  M;1  t  Tg
where P tm
k is a vector of prices for all acquisitions of player k. The last set describes the reposi-
tioning





k ) : 1  k  K;1  m  M;1  t  Tg
where F mt
k is a vector of chosen characteristics for products owned by rm k.
Set Y1 is used to estimate the acquisition probability distribution Prob
M
k as a function of (!;d).
In a perfect world, one would like to employ a form of non-parametric multi-dimensional discrete
choice estimator. However, in practice, the researcher is likely to face two problems: the large
9dimensionality of covariates (!;d) and the large dimensionality of the Prob
M
k support (due to a
big number of active products/companies that can be acquired).




that exhausts most of the information in the data. The asymptotics of such an estimator are
similar to the non-parametric estimators in which the dimensionality of pseudo-parameters M
grow as the dataset becomes large.
The second problem is more severe and in most cases cannot be solved without additional
assumptions. The following examples suggest dierent possible approaches.
Example 3.1 (One acquisition per period). If the acquisitions in the data tend to be rare, one
could potentially assume that only one acquisition per owner is allowed each period. This reduces
the decision space to only one dimension and enables direct application of any discrete choice model
(for example logit or probit) on the data set Y1.
The second example suggests how to deal with multiple acquisitions
Example 3.2 (Independent acqusitions). In the case where the acquisition decisions are uncorre-
lated conditional on !k and dk one could employ a discrete choice regression directly on Y1, xing
!tm
k for all decisions in ~ atm
k .
The next solution makes more assumptions about the structure of the acquisition decision
making within the rm.
Example 3.3 (Sequential acqusitions). Suppose that the acquisition decisions are made in a se-
quence, i.e., after observing  j for a particular product, the rm decides about its acquisition
without looking at the payo shocks   for other stations. In this case one could further expand
dataset Y1 to incorporate the sequence of decisions within the rm. Because of the additive struc-
ture of payos and the fact that  j are IID, one could consistently estimate Prob
M
k by using a
discrete choice estimator on the extended dataset.
If one were to observe the acquisition prices one could estimate the pricing function P(!st
k )
10directly from the dataset Y2. This could be achieved by employing the exible parametric inter-
polation2.
When estimating the repositioning probabilities Prob
R
k one faces similar problems, but addi-
tionally one has to deal with multinomial vs. binomial choice. The three examples of solutions to
that problem presented previously also apply here.
Additionally, one could endogenize the continuous characteristic  and estimate it as a function
of the state space using the methods presented in Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2004). Depending
on the interpretation of , this might involve an additional model. In this paper however, t as
well as dt are treated as exogenous and Markov. The transition in this case can be estimated as a
exible parametric auto-regressive process.
In the next subsection I describe a second stage of the cost function estimator that uses the
estimators of equilibrium policy and the transition of  and dt obtained in the rst step above.
3.3 Minimum distance estimator
For the second stage the parameters of the xed cost F and repositioning cost R are estimated
using a minimum distance estimator. The estimator is constructed using the MPE inequalities
(2.4). The remainder of this section describes how I obtain estimates of the value functions in
those inequalities.



















































2Sometimes the dataset on prices is sparse, i.e., one does not observe prices for every deal. In this case more
simplifying assumptions about the pricing process are needed.










































is the expected stream of xed costs and repositioning costs. The extra parameters  and   are
needed because the rst stage estimation requires normalization of the variances of  and  .
Accounting for Bt
k in the simulation of prots from a merger takes care of selection on unob-
servables, as apposed to the usual static approach to mergers. Given the merger decision atm
jk , the
contribution of unobserved prots is E[tm
jk jatm
jk ]. Because a company observes the payo shock
before making an acquisition, the mergers that occur are selected for high value of tm
jk When  has
zero mean, it is the case that E[tm
jk jatm
jk = 1] > 0. Failing to account for that (i.e. assuming that
E[tm
jk jatm
jk = 1] = E[tm
jk ] = 0) would cause underestimation of prots from mergers and overesti-
mation of xed cost synergies 3. The same point can be made about the selection on unobservables
when repositioning products and inclusion of Ct
k.
Note that only the last part of Dt
k depends on the parameters of interest F and C and the
value function is linear  and  . Therefore, to compute the value function for dierent parameter
values one does not need to re-simulate the industry path (st;dt); moreover, one does not need




4. This saves a large amount of processing power and makes the
estimator feasible using today's computers.
Following the inequality (2.4), let V t
k be an equilibrium value function for player k, Vk(jg
k;g
 k).
Additionally, dene a suboptimal value function ~ V t
k to be Vk(jgk;g
k) for some o-equilibrium
strategy gk. In equilibrium, I know that maxf~ V k
t   V t
k;0g = 0 for the true values of M and R.
3When using any of the dynamic likelihood estimators proposed in the previous subsection and assuming that 
is a dierence of two independent Type I extreme value random variables, E[ja = 1] can be reduced to  log(p) 
1 p
p log(1   p), where p is a probability of acquisition.
4In most cases At
k is the hardest to compute because computing   may involve solving a one-shot Nash equilibrium
price or a quantity setting game.
12Thus, I dene a minimum distance estimator
(^ M; ^ R) = argmin
1












According to the results in Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2004) this estimator is consistent and
asymptotically normal. This nishes the description of the estimator. An example of its application
is contained in the next section.
4 Application
In this section, I describe how to use above framework to estimate merger synergies from ownership
consolidation in the U.S. radio industry. In the next subsection I give a brief review of the industry.
The second subsection presents the tailored version of the estimation algorithm. The last subsection
presents and discusses the results.
4.1 Industry and data description
Radio is an important medium in the U.S., reaching about 94% of Americans twelve years old or
older each week. Moreover, the average consumer listens to about 20 hours of radio per week and
between 6am and 6pm more people use radio than TV or print media5. There are about 13,000
commercial radio stations that broadcast in about 350 local markets nationwide. Before 1996,
this industry had ownership limitations both nationally and locally, preventing big corporations
from entering the market and thereby sustaining a large degree of family based ownership. This
situation changed with the Telecom Act of 1996 which, among other things, raised the ownership
caps in the local markets (see Table 1).
This triggered an unprecedented merger and product repositioning wave that completely re-
shaped the industry. Figure 1 contains the average percentage of stations that switched owners
and that switched formats. Between 1996 and 2000 more than 10% of stations switched owners
annually. After 2000 the number dropped to less than 4%. Greater ownership concentration in
the 1996-2000 period was also associated with more format switching. The percentage of stations
5Source: A.Richter (2006)





Table 1: Change in the local ownership caps introduced by the 1996 Telecom Act.
that switched formats peaked in 1998 and 2001 at 13%. In eect, the Herndahl-Hirschman Index
(HHI) in the listenership market grew from 0:18 in 1996 to about 0:3 in 2006.
The impact of this consolidation on consumer surplus has been studied before using a static
demand and supply approach. For example Jeziorski (2010) (Chapter 2 of this thesis), nds that
consolidation of ownership in this industry was harmful to advertisers, causing $300m loss in
advertiser surplus, but benecial to listeners, raising the welfare by 1%.
In order to analyze the supply side eects of this consolidation, I compiled a dataset 6. on
stations in the 88 markets studied by Jeziorski (2010). The data contains ownership for each
station oj, and station format fj. It uses the estimates of station quality j, contained in Jeziorski
(2010). I also observe each acquisition made in this market and the average acquisition price.
4.2 Static prots
The static prot function is taken directly from Jeziorski (2010). Radio station owners draw their
revenue from selling advertising and each advertising slot is priced on a per listener basis. The









where q are the equilibrium advertising quantities chosen in the static oligopoly game, rj is the
number of listeners and pj is the price per listener. In this paper, I treat the estimates of this
prot function as given; however, I do correct the standard errors of the dynamic estimates by
6Data is constructed using the software provided by BIA Financial Network Inc. and Media Market Guides by
SQAD
14Figure 1: Dynamics of station acquisition and format switching
accounting for the noise introduced by estimating prot function.
The only dierence between the baseline model in Jeziorski (2010) and the prot function used
in this chapter is that the marginal cost of production is set to zero and format substitution matrix

 is assumed to be diagonal. I made these assumptions for computational reasons.
4.3 Estimation details
The estimation is a direct application of the framework desribed in subsection 3. The model
endogenizes acquisition decisions and format switching decisions. The dynamics in an unobserved
radio station quality  is assumed to be exogenous.
The rst piece of the model that needs to be specied is the function I(st;dt), that prescribes the
sequence of moves rms make in the merger and repositioning process. Following Gowrisankaran
(1999), I assume that rms with the biggest total market shares move rst. This is motivated
by the fact that the bigger players in the market might a have rst-mover advantage over smaller
players. The acquisition price is assumed to be constant within market and equal to the observed
mean acquisition price.
15To estimate the merger probability I use the method outlined in the Example 3.3. Each owner
considers, one at a time, stations to acquire, starting from the one with the highest quality measure
j, and moving down according to j
7. A ow chart of the merger process is presented in the














 k is the number of stations owned by competitors. If we assume that   is a dierence of
two extreme value distributions and is also revealed in a sequence, one can consistently estimate
a probability of merger Prob
M
k , by running a regular logit regression on this extended dataset.
The covariates in the logit regression should reect the information about the state space
contained in the data. In a perfect world one would use a very exible index function of the state
space variables. However, because of high dimensionality of the state space, such an approach
requires too many degrees of freedom, and quickly exhausts all the information available in the
data. To overcome this problem, I use a linear index function of several statistics about the state
space computed from the data 8. The full set of covariates can be found in Table 5 in Appendix
C.
A similar strategy can be employed to estimate the format switching process. The ow chart de-
scribing this process is contained in Appendix B. Assuming that rms switch formats sequentially













Using this auxiliary dataset one can apply a multinomial logit model to estimate the format
switching probabilities Prob
R
k . The restriction on the index function also applies in this case, so I
use only a limited set of covariates (given in Table 6 in Appendix C).
In the second stage of the estimation, I parametrize the xed cost function
F(s
tm
k ) = C1  POPm  n
tm
k C2 (4.1)
where POPm is a population of the market m and nkt is the number of stations owned by player
k at time t. Parameter C2 dictates the amount of cost synergies from owning multiple stations.
7Choice of j as an ordering characteristic is motivated by the fact that it is a vertical measure of protability.
8a similar approach can be found in Sweeting (2007), Ryan (2005), Ryan and Tucker (2006), and Ellickson and
Arie (2005).
16I also assume a constant format switching cost that is proportional to the population. Those
assumptions are motivated by the fact that Jeziorski (2010) nds that most of the variation in
marginal cost of radio operations between can be explained by the variation in total population.
In the second stage, I simulate the value function only for the owner with the biggest market
share at each data point (stm;dtm). These simulations are done according to the Algorithms 2 and
3. The suboptimal value function ~ Vk is obtained by multiplying the merger and format switching
probability by a uniform [:95;1:05] random variable. When choosing the size of the perturbations
one faces a bias and variance trade-o. When the size is too small the estimator start picking
up the noise from the simulations instead of the sub-optimality of the strategy, decreasing the
eciency of the estimator. When the size is chosen to be too big, the bounds of the estimator
become very large creating potential bias. The chosen perturbation is a compromise between those
two factors.
4.4 Results
This subsection describes the results of the estimation. The exposition is divided into two parts.
First, I present the policy function estimates. Then, I report the main results on xed cost and
switching cost synergies.
4.4.1 First stage: Policy function
Tables 7 and 8 report coecients from a purchase strategy probit approximation. They reveal that
owners with larger market shares are more likely to purchase new stations and are less likely to sell.
Also, there are synergies when purchasing multiple stations. The coecient on the rst purchase
dummy PUR0 is negative while coecients on dummies for multiple purchases are positive. This
indicates that it is easier to negotiate the purchase of many stations, or even an entire company
at once, than a single station. The number of owned stations in the format (the FORMAT variable
in the table) has a negative inuence on purchase decisions. This is evidence for diversication.
The coecient of station quality is positive which suggests that stations with higher quality are
purchased more often.
Table 9 presents the inuence on future format of the following covariates: change of ownership
dummy, AM/FM status, and previous format. The negative coecient of a Spanish format in the
17rst row of the table suggests that when a station is purchased it is less likely to switch to Spanish
format. On the other hard, the positive coecient of AC tells us that change in ownership is
correlated with switching to the Adult Contemporary format. The second column of the table
shows that FM stations are likely be of Rock or CHR format, and not so likely to be of News/Talk
format. The remaining rows of the table describe the Markov dynamics of formats. The diagonal
cells have much higher numbers than the o-diagonal ones, which reects the fact that staying in
the current format is much more probable than switching.
Table 10 presents the relationship between the current demographic composition of the market
format switching decisions. In addition, Table 11 contains similar information concerning the dy-
namics of the demographics (the dierence between two consecutive periods) and format switching.
One can observe many patterns that suggest rms respond to the current state of population de-
mographics as well as to the dynamics of population demographics. For example, a larger current
population and growth of the Hispanic population is ralated to the stations switching to a Hispanic
format. One can observe a similar pattern for Blacks and the Urban format, as well as for older
people and the News/Talk format. Those patters largely reect correlations between tastes for
formats and demographics described in Jeziorski (2010).
4.4.2 Second stage: Fixed and switching cost
The estimated parameters of the xed cost equation (4.1) are as follows: ^ C1 = 0:69 and ^ C2 = 0:59.
Table 2 interprets the economic signicance of these parameters in terms the amount of saved xed
costs per year if two stations are commonly owned compared to being separate companies. Since
the amount of cost synergies depends on the market population, only three representative markets
are presented. Los Angeles is the biggest market in the sample and the cost savings in that
market amount to about $4.4m per-year (roughly 10% of the revenue of a big station). Knoxville
is representative of medium markets and has about $0.23m of such cost savings, and Bismark,
a small market, has about $34k of savings. Table 3 presents total cost savings from all mergers
after the Telecom Act was passed. It turns out that the merger activity lowered the xed cost of
providing radio programming by almost $2.5b, amounting to almost 10% of the total revenue of the
industry. Compared to that, the impact on advertiser surplus identied in Jeziorski (2010) is very
small. This leads me to conclude that the deregulation of 1996 provided substantial operational
18Market Los Angeles Knoxville Bismarck
Population 13m .7m 100k
Savings per year $4.4m $.23m $34k










Table 3: Total cost savings created by mergers after 1996, compared to demand eects from Jeziorski
(2010)
ecients that outweigh negative impacts on advertiser welfare.
The last set of estimates concern the product repositioning costs. The estimate of the cost
parameter ^ C is 2:1. The repositioning cost for each market is the population of that market
multiplied ^ C. Examples of this cost are given in Table 4. The table suggests this cost is about
the yearly revenue of a big station. Such a huge repositioning cost can justify some of the behavior
found when analyzing the merger probabilities; namely, stations tend to stay away from purchasing
the formats they already have. If the format switching costs were low, the optimal thing to do
would be to purchase stations close to your portfolio to get rid of competition and rebrand them
to avoid cannibalization. However, if the switching costs are high, it might be optimal to avoid
paying them and purchase a station further away. The previous subsection and Sweeting (2008)
presest the evidence of the latter type of behavior, reinforcing the nding of high switching cost
estimates.
Market Los Angeles Knoxville Bismarck
Switching cost $27m $1.5m $0.2m
Table 4: Format switching cost for chosen markets
195 Conclusions
This paper proposed a new estimator of a production cost curve that enables the identication
of cost synergies from mergers. The estimation uses inequalities representing an equilibrium of a
dynamic game with endogenous mergers and product repositioning decisions.
The biggest advantage of this estimator is that it enables the identication of the cost curve just
from merger decisions, without using cost data. Since reliable cost data is very hard to obtain, the
cost side analysis of mergers was very hard to perform. This method is able to solve this problem,
and provides a powerful tool for policy makers to improve their merger assessments.
Since the proposed method is based on a fully dynamic framework, it additionally solves many
of the problems of static merger analysis. First of all, endogenizing the merger decision allows
for sample selection on unobservables in the estimation and correcting for the fact that only the
most protable mergers are carried out. Moreover, I allow for follow-up mergers and merger waves.
Additionally, endogenizing product characteristics enables correction for post-merger product repo-
sitioning.
The estimator belongs to a class of indirect estimators proposed by Hotz, Miller, Sanders, and
Smith (1994) and Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2004). Therefore, it shares all the benets of those
estimators, such as conceptual simplicity of implementation and computational feasibility, because
it avoids the computation of an equilibrium. However, it also shares their downsides, such as a
loss in eciency.
The estimator was applied to analyze the cost side benets of a deregulation of the U.S. radio
industry. It turns out that the consolidation wave in that industry between 1996 and 2006 provided
substantial cost synergies. These amounted to about 2 billion dollars per, year and constitute
about 10% of industry revenue. Such benets are an order of magnitude larger than potential
losses in advertiser welfare found by Jeziorski (2010). This provides a signicant argument for
the supporters of a deregulation bill, and serves as an example of how cost curve estimation can
provide additional insights supplementing traditional merger analysis.
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24Appendices
A Estimation without acquisition prices
In case the pricing function ^ P r
jk cannot be estimated in the rst state because of data constraint,
one could employ a bargaining model for infer it. Suppose one employs a parametrization ^ P(!jP).
For an initial value of parameters 0
P one could compute a surplus from acquisition of the product
j by an owner k using simulated ^ V t
k and ^ V t
k0 where k0 is the current owner of product j. Then
using a bargaining model one could infer prices and t a new parametrization 1
P. If repeating this
procedure leads to convergence, then obtain a parametrization ^ P and value functions ^ V t
k that are
consistent with eachother. The detailed description of this procedure is given in the Algorithm
1. The big dowside of this approch is that one needs resolve this procedure for any set of cost
parameters and cannot take advantage of linearing of the value function. It makes the procedure
infeasible to use for large datasets because of computational burden. However, given the rapid
hardware development it is reasonable to think it it would be feasible in the near future.
Algorithm 1: Estimator without price data
Take any 0
P;
Let r = 0;
repeat
Simulate the value functions ^ V r using pricing process ^ P(!jr
P);
Compute surplus from any acquisition using the simulated value functions;
Compute acquisition prices ^ Pjm by applying any bargaining game;
Fit new parameters 
r+1
P using ^ Pjm;
until convergence of r
P ;
B Radio acquisition and format switching algorithms
This section of the appendix contains a detailed ows of the algorithms used to simulate the value
function from section 4.
25Algorithm 2: Merger algorithm
Let !r
1 = sr;
foreach rm k in a sequence I(sr) do
Let J k be a set of stations not owned by k sorted by r
j;
foreach station j in J k do
Set purchase price Pr
jk =  Pm;




Draw a random number u from U[0;1];























foreach rm k in a sequence I(sr) do
Let Jk be a set of stations owned by k sorted by r
j;
foreach station j in Jk do








k by r tE[ jfr
j ];
if the fj changed then
Update ~ !r
k;





k+1 = ~ !tm
k ;
end
C Policy function covariates
This section of the appendix contains tables of covariates used in the rst stage in the estimation
in section 4.
26Format switching strategy
PUR Dummy equal to 1 if station was recently purchased
FM AM/FM dummy, equals to 1 if considered station is FM
FORMAT Past format dummies
PORT F Number of stations owner in format F
PORT COMPJ F Number of stations competitor J owns in format F, competitors of ranking 4 or
higher are pooled
XI PORT F Average quality of stations owner in format F
XI PORT COMPJ F Average quality of stations competitor J owns in format F, competitors of rank-
ing 4 or higher are pooled
- Demographic characteristics of the market
Table 5: Covariates for the format switching strategy multinomial logic regression.
27Purchase strategy
OWNER1...OWNER4 Dummies that are equal to the ranking of the player in terms of total market share of owned stations.
If ranking is lower that 4 we activate the fourth dummy
PAST OWNER1...PAST OWNER4 Ranking of the previous owner of the station amongst the competitors.
TRIAL Describes how many stations did this player considered to purchase already this period. For expla-
nation of sequential purchase decision process look in Section 4.3
PUR0...PUR3 Dummies describing number of stations already purchased
FORMAT Number of stations owned in the format of considered station
FORMAT COMP1...FORMAT COMP4 Number of stations owned by competitors in the considered station, by ranking. FORMAT COMP4 are
pooled competitors with ranking of 4 or higher
FM AM/FM dummy, equals to 1 if considered station is FM
PORT F Number of stations owner in format F
PORT COMPJ F Number of stations competitor J owns in format F, competitors of ranking 4 or higher are pooled
XI Average quality of stations owned in the format of considered station
XI COMP1...XI COMP4 Average quality of stations owned by competitors in the considered station, by ranking. XI COMP4
are pooled competitors with ranking of 4 or higher
XI PORT F Average quality of stations owner in format F
XI PORT COMPJ F Average quality of stations competitor J owns in format F, competitors of ranking 4 or higher are
pooled
- Dummies of the format of considered station interacted with demographic characteristics of the
market
Table 6: Covariates for the purchase strategy logic regression.
2
8D Frist stage estimates: Dynamic model
Top 1 Owner Top 2 Owner Top 3 Owner
Buyer 0:5127 0:3423 0:2608
Seller  0:3772  0:2792  0:0257


















Table 8: Station purchase policy estimates - other variables





PURCHASE 0:30  0:14 0:04  0:07 0:05 0:03  0:23  0:22
FM 1:26 1:54 1:35 1:06  0:25 1:31 0:56 0:85
AC 3:70  0:47  0:34  0:86  0:43 0:37  0:66  0:44
Rock  0:27 4:41  0:58  0:18  0:10 0:48  0:32  0:21
CHR  0:24  0:42 4:38  0:06  0:19 0:00  0:14  0:35
Urban
Alt.
 0:49 0:05  0:35 4:06  0:17 0:48  0:15  0:22
News
Talk
 1:00  0:84  0:82  1:29 3:89 0:25  0:80  0:93
Country  1:14  1:01  1:06  1:35  0:63 4:76  0:73  1:15
Spanish  1:61  1:45  1:30  1:61  1:20  0:29 3:10  1:42
Other  0:89  1:07  1:31  1:27  0:86 0:00  1:22 3:02
Dark  2:18  2:42  2:50  2:62  1:61  0:72  1:60  1:31
Table 9: Format switching policy estimates - format dynamics





Age 12-17 0:00  0:27 0:04  0:50  0:33  0:67  0:50  0:32
Age 18-24 0:00  0:31  0:26  0:69 0:31 0:00  0:42  0:36
Age 25-34  0:54 0:00 0:02  0:37  0:14  0:99  0:06  0:32
Age 35-44  0:48  0:00  0:20  0:32  0:06  1:17  0:42  0:08
Age 45-49  0:46 0:00  0:93  0:61 0:23  0:89  0:81  0:09
Age 50-54  0:44  0:41  1:36  0:67 0:42  0:82  0:62  0:09
Age 55-64 0:00  0:64  1:49  0:68 0:34  0:77  0:42  0:16
Gender  0:41  0:23  0:43  0:54  0:00  0:84  0:34  0:21
Some HS  0:38  0:49  0:41  0:33  0:27  0:13 0:06 0:02
HS Grad. 0:19 0:00  0:52  0:32  0:84  0:29  0:90  0:19
Some College  0:12  0:34  0:72  0:70 0:23  0:45  0:45  0:03
Income 0-25k  0:16  0:83  0:32  0:13  0:35  0:43  0:52  0:03
Income 25k-50k  0:06  0:54 0:14  0:39  0:33  0:34  0:13 0:00
Income 50k-75k  0:07  0:02  0:54  0:22 0:21  0:39  1:10  0:17
Black  0:99  0:58 0:00 1:25  0:44  1:11  0:54  0:26
Hispanic  0:55 0:19  0:36  0:06  0:49  0:20 2:42  0:56
Table 10: Format switching policy estimates - current demographics





Age 12-17 0:00 0:00 0:00 6:69  5:06 0:00 9:33 0:00
Age 18-24  7:73 3:44 17:89 0:00 0:00  12:76 0:00 6:06
Age 25-34 4:29 0:00 0:00 0:00  1:35 5:23 4:32  3:59
Age 35-44 2:65 0:00 5:23 1:83  4:83 0:00 2:67 1:73
Age 45-49  3:31 0:00 9:04 0:00 2:31  3:45  2:98 2:59
Age 50-54  3:27 0:00  2:60  1:95 1:63 0:04  3:37 0:00
Age 55-64  4:57  3:19  7:50 0:00 7:73 0:00  1:12 0:00
Gender 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00
Some HS  0:03  0:06 1:14 0:33 1:08  0:06  0:34  1:09
HS Grad.  0:56 0:00 1:18 0:90 0:84  0:16  0:31  0:47
Some College  0:40  0:64 0:50 0:24 0:36 0:00 1:33  0:89
Income 0-25k 0:43 0:37 0:05 0:20 0:32 0:33  0:63 0:18
Income 25k-50k  0:01 0:61  0:19  0:49 0:18  0:36  1:11  0:44
Income 50k-75k 0:32 0:64 0:51  0:02  0:01  0:01 0:17 0:41
Black 4:09  21:64  49:49 3:51 0:00 8:71 0:00 5:16
Hispanic  2:86  1:55  3:64 0:77  0:24  1:65 4:84 0:00
Table 11: Format switching policy estimates - demographic dynamics
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